This paper assesses the importance of the role of prices as aggregators of private information in the S&P 500 futures market. We estimate primitive parameters of the Hellwig (1980) noisy rational expectations model, when both prices and terminal values are observable. The variance-covariance parameters governing futures prices and terminal values can be inverted to obtain estimates of the primitive parameters, including the precision of private information and the variance of liquidity motivated trades. We also estimate coefficients in the linear price conjecture, weights that agents place on different sources of information, and the informativeness of prices. We find that the variance of the error term in agents' private signals is several orders of magnitude larger than the variance of liquidity motivated trades. But in a large market prices are still so informative that the market as a whole appears to weight them more than prior beliefs.
Introduction
The growth of the noisy rational expectations literature has emphasized that observable market prices serve at least two important roles. Firstly, they help define the opportunity sets of agents. They also act as potentially informative signals, conveying information about relevant unobservable variables. There is considerable understanding of the empirical significance of the first role of prices 1 . There is much less work in assessing the empirical significance of the role of prices as signals 2 . This paper takes a small step towards redressing this imbalance.
We show that a noisy rational expectations model under perfect competition (a la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) ) provides a reasonable description of the S & P 500 futures market that we study. It is a market with a large number of players, and the influence of any one player seems limited, so the large-market paradigm is more plausible for this market than many other financial markets. In this setting the value of prices as costlessly observable signals depends on several parameters: the prior variance of terminal value, i.e. the spot price at maturity, the variance of the error term in agents' private signals, the variance of liquidity motivated trades, and the level of risk aversion. If agents have very good priors and the prior variance of terminal value is small, the potential benefit from any additional information, be it a private signal or a publicly observable price, would be small. If the precision of private signals that agents have is small, and if the quality of even the aggregate information that could be reflected in the market price is low, then the price would be of little informational value. If noise provided by liquidity motivated trades is large, then again market prices would be of limited value as public signals. Finally, if risk aversion is large, agents would react very cautiously to their private information, causing less of the information to be incorporated into prices. Thus, prices are ceteris paribus more significant sources of information about asset value, as priors become worse, private information quality rises, liquidity noise decreases, and risk aversion falls.
The primary purpose of this paper is to take a step towards formally quantifying such parameters. This would allow us to assess the numerical impact of at least some parameters on the informativeness of prices, which is of some interest in itself given the paucity of available parameter estimates, and may help decide if conditioning on prices is indeed an empirically important assumption. The availability of parameter estimates may also enable us to ask further questions pertaining to the information structure: are parameters stable, are they correlated with other fundamental variables, which may give further clues to the nature of the market for information.
The starting point for our work is a version of the static Hellwig (1980) model with common risk aversion across all agents, which, because of the assumptions of linearity, normality, CARA utility, a single asset, a large market and symmetry across all agents, may be regarded as the simplest among the class of perfect competition noisy rational expectations models: it has the fewest exogenous parameters. The equilibrium in this model defines the parameters of the bivariate distribution of price and terminal value, as functions of primitive parameters such as the variance of liquidity motivated trades, the variance of errors in private signals, the prior variance of terminal value, and risk aversion. We first present a theoretical result that is the basis of our empirical work. We show that the functional relationship between these primitive parameters and the parameters of the variance-covariance matrix between price and terminal value can be inverted to obtain the values of the primitive parameters as functions of the variance-covariance parameters. Invoking the invariance principle of maximum likelihood estimation we can use this inverse relationship to easily obtain the MLE's of our primitive parameters conditional on values of the risk aversion coefficient. It turns out that the estimator for the variance of errors in private signals is in fact independent of the level of risk aversion, so it is an unconditional MLE. This allows us to make a limited assessment of ancillary quantities which are functions of primitive parameters, like the coefficients of the linear price conjecture, the weights agents place on different sources of information in forming their expectations of terminal value, and the signal-tonoise ratio.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we summarize the model of Hellwig (1980) , and present the theoretical result that underlies the empirical work in this paper. Section 2 presents different sets of primitive parameter estimates, tests of the model, and estimates of ancillary quantities. Section 3 makes some concluding remarks.
II. Theory
For the reader's convenience we first summarize the development in Hellwig (1980) .
Assume that there exists a perfectly competitive market for trading in an asset with risky payoff v . Assume a large market, in which there is a continuum of agents on the unit interval, each of whom gets a signal of identical quality but with idiosyncratic error, where each agent's signal is given by ~~θ ε
0 1 where ṽ and ε i are independent, and ṽ is distributed normally with mean µ v and variance σ v 2 ; ε i with mean zero and varianceσ ε 2 . There is also a riskless asset which serves as the numeraire, and which earns zero interest. Agents' preferences are described by a CARA utility function with identical risk aversion parameter ρ .
Agents decide on how much of the risky asset to buy after observing their private signal, and by learning whatever they can from the realized price where this equilibrium price random variable is assumed to be a function of the average information of all agents, and liquidity motivated trades S x , which is normally distributed with zero mean and varianceσ s 2 . Equilibrium is defined in this market by (a) agents' optimization taking the realized price as given, (b) market clearing, and (c) the requirement that agents' conjectures about the relationship between the price random variable and both aggregate private information and liquidity motivated trades be confirmed.
Using the main result in Hellwig (1980) , we get Proposition 1: Let the price random variable ˜ P be defined as a linear function of aggregate private information and liquidity noise
Then in equilibrium, the coefficients are given by
We can interpret the Hellwig (1980) equilibrium as defining the parameters of the distribution of a bivariate normal random variable, (~,~) P v . In particular we get (5)   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   2   1 
Note that if both prices and terminal values are observable (as one can assume in the case of futures contracts, which have a well-defined maturity date and terminal price) the above parameters can be easily estimated using sample moments. But what is of greater interest is whether we can obtain estimates of the primitive parameters, especially σ s 2 , governing noise produced by liquidity-motivated trading, and σ ε 2 , governing the precision of private information.
The following result, which is the basis for the empirical work in this paper, helps provide an answer to this question.
Proposition 2:
The above relations (5)- (7) can be inverted to obtain
Notice that the expression for σ ε 2 is independent of the absolute risk aversion 
In seeking to sign the comparative statics we use a variety of restrictions that follow simply from the positive definiteness of variance-covariance matrices, and the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium: price variation is ascribed to liquidity noise. What is more subtle is the implication of the rational expectations equilibrium for our estimate of the quality of private information. Given that we satisfy all the relevant inequality restrictions, higher price volatility implies better private information. The key lies in noting that in our CARA-normal environment each agent's demand for the risky asset is increasing in the precision of private information, so that ceteris paribus, they react more strongly to their information.
With respect to 1 Z , however, the sign depends on the magnitudes of all three endogenous parameters. Since we can estimate the endogenous parameters we can evaluate the comparative statics at the estimated parameter values. This is done later in Table 3 , after we present numerical estimates of all the parameters. Once the primitive parameters, σ ν 2 , σ ε 2 and ρ σ 2 2 s , are estimated, several important ancillary quantities are also estimated. First, we estimate the coefficients in the price conjecture (greek parameters in Equation (1)). The results will help us understand the relative importance of the factors in determining the equilibrium price. Second, note that the agent i's expectation of the terminal value conditional on the prior, µ ν , his private signal, θ i , and market price, P, is given by
Finally, we investigate the informativeness of the futures prices. We do this by (a)
evaluating the signal-to-signal-plus-noise (hereafter SSN) ratio, defined as (1/σ ε 2 ) / (1/σ ε 2 + σ s 2 ), and (b) decomposing the price variance. From equation (18) above, this SSN ratio becomes the coefficient, h 2 , when ρ is equal to 1. This suggests that in general, given a value of risk-aversion parameter, a higher SSN ratio will result in a more informative price. In decomposing the futures price variance, we investigate how much of it is attributable to the variance of aggregate signals as opposed to liquidity motivated trades.
Before we move on to the next section, it is worthwhile to note that the estimators obtained by transforming the sample moments by using Proposition 2 are the maximum likelihood estimators (hereafter MLE's). This is because given a Gaussian likelihood, the sample moments of the (~,~) P v distribution are MLE's, and any one-to-one transformation of MLE's will yield MLE's by the Invariance Principle of maximum likelihood estimation.
III. Empirical Implementation

A. Data
We assume a simple i.i.d. dynamic structure with a finite horizon as in Admati-Pfleiderer (1988) : weekly innovations and noise variables are all i.i.d., causing the individual optimization problem for each agent to reduce to a sequence of 1-period problems. This is important in allowing us to invoke the static equilibrium in Hellwig (1980) as the characterization of equilibrium on any date before maturity.
Our empirical work is primarily focused on primitive parameter estimation. This exercise is similar in spirit to recent examples in the context of asset pricing models under imperfect competition, such as Foster and Viswanathan (1995) and Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1996, 1997) . However, as it is meaningful to interpret parameter estimates only if the underlying model is not rejected, we also implement a test of the model. In doing so we focus first on the static Hellwig (1980) equilibrium, and treat it distinctly from the i.i.d. dynamic structure in which it is embedded. We comment on the additional dynamic restrictions later.
We collected data on S & P 500 futures and spot prices from the Datastream database. In order to build a data set in which the observations preserve the 'i.i.d.-ness' as much as possible, we do the following. In each of futures and spot prices, the data covers four contracts in a year, extending from those expiring at the end of September 1982, to those expiring at the end of December 1997. As a result, there are 62 contracts in total in the data set. Our proxy for terminal value, ν, was given by spot price on the maturity date, whereas our proxy for price, P, was given by futures price obtained at fixed weekly intervals before maturity: six intervals from two to seven weeks before maturity date. For example, for September 1982 contract, we collect the closing 5 cash index on September 17, 1982, which was the maturity date for the contract, and closing futures prices on two to seven weeks before September 17,1992. Therefore, we have in total 62 pairs of price and liquidity value for each of two to seven week maturities. We ignored dates closer to maturity as trading tends to be thin then, making the underlying assumption of a large and active market in the Hellwig (1980) model less tenable 6 .
Since the dataset spans a 13-year period, stationarity of the process generating the raw price and terminal value may not obtain, in the empirical work we deflate price (terminal value) by the futures price eight weeks prior to maturity. 7 The raw data satisfy the restriction of strict proportionality to the deflator series, hence the transformed data variables satisfy the stationarity requirement.
Since our estimates of primitive parameters would be meaningful only if we can assert that the Hellwig (1980) model is a valid candidate description of the market, we check the plausibility of the model. First, for our variance estimators in Proposition 2 to be meaningful, they must be positive. This imposes constraints on the MLE's of the (~,~) P v variance-covariance matrix. Since the estimators are undefined when these constraints are binding, we can use them to assess the a priori reasonableness or plausibility of the Hellwig (1980) model as a description of the markets from which the data are drawn. For the S & P futures contract data we use, these constraints were all met.
Second, we test the assumption that the data are drawn from a normal sample, using the Bera-Jarque (1982) statistic, which uses information from the third and fourth moments. For each of the seven series (transformed spot prices on maturity date, and transformed futures prices at each of the six weekly intervals before maturity), we computed the Bera-Jarque statistic, which is distributed asymptotically as a chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom, and compared it to the critical values (9.21 for 1%; 5.991 for 5%). The Bera-Jarque statistics range from 0.012 to 3.53, and the hypothesis of normality is justified.
We also formally tested the model by using a sample of 42 observations to estimate primitive parameters. Then, by using Equation (1), we evaluate the predicted futures price of the 20 out-of-sample futures contracts 8 . This is possible since the estimates of the primitive parameters allow us to estimate α and β, of which the actual estimates are given in In presenting our work, it is convenient to first present the parameter estimates.
B. Parameter Estimates
Please insert Table 1 approximately here.
Please insert Table 2 approximately here. Table 1 presents the sample moments of the (~,~) P v distribution, while Table 2 provides estimates of the primitive parameters. To obtain standard errors we use a numerical procedure to evaluate the Hessian of the bivariate likelihood function at this point. The most graphic implication of the estimates in Table 2 is that our estimates for σ s 2 are smaller than our estimates of σ ε 2 by several orders of magnitude in all cases. In ongoing research using FX forward contracts motivated by the forward premium puzzle, corresponding estimates suggest that the level of liquidity noise in those markets is much higher than the variance of errors in private signals.
The magnitude of 2 s σ becomes larger with a smaller ρ. Overall, these numbers suggest that noise in the price due to the noise in agents' private information is much greater than due to the liquidity motivated trades. time approaches maturity date, the level of liquidity trading is also non-monotone.
C. Comparative Statics
Please insert Table 3 approximately here. arising from a change in any endogenous parameter are several orders of magnitude greater in absolute value than changes in σ s 2 . It is important to note, though, that these responses are valid only for small changes, and given the complex nonlinear form in equations (8) and (9) for larger changes we cannot draw any inferences about magnitudes. 9 The primary message is that errors in estimating the variance of prices is less likely to cause big deviations in estimates of liquidity noise σ s 2 than in estimates of σ ε 2 , the variance of error in private signals.
D. Coefficients in the Price Function
Please insert Table 4 approximately here.
By obtaining primitive parameter estimates we are also in a position to estimate the coefficients in the price conjecture, given in Equation (1). The estimates are presented in Table 4 for the case when ρ = 0.5, 1, and 10. First, as time approaches maturity date, the market puts more weight on the aggregate information, and less on the prior. For example, with ρ = 1, the weight on the aggregate private information, β, increases from 21% to 74%, whereas the weight on the prior, α, decreases from 79% to 26%. Second, with a higher risk aversion parameter, the weight on the prior becomes smaller and that on the aggregate private information, larger. This suggests that when the agents are more risk averse, even though each agent will trade less aggresively on his private signal, the market as a whole puts more weight on the aggregate private information than on the prior. The reason behind this seemingly counter-intuitive result is that though traders are less willing to trade on their private information, the large-market assumption still ensures that the aggregate private information is precise, so traders rely more on the price.
Finally, a striking feature of Table 4 is that the coefficient on liquidity noise ( γ ) is larger by at least two orders of magnitude, showing the great sensitivity of prices to changes in realized liquidity motivated trades. However, it should also be noted that since the variance of liquidity trading is small, the overall impact of the liquidity trading on price variation will be limited.
E. Tests of the Model
Please insert Table 5 approximately here. Table 5 . This joint hypothesis is not rejected closer to maturity (5 weeks and below, though at 4 weeks it is borderline). While the adjusted 2 R is over 50% at 6 weeks away or closer to maturity the model is less adequate as a description of the market from which the data are drawn when we are further away from maturity date (the adjusted 2 R is only 38% at 7 weeks away). The univariate tests of 0 0 = γ and 1 1 = γ are also informative.
For both parameters, there is no rejection except for week 6. Curiously, when 7 weeks away, the univariate tests don't yield rejection, but the joint test does.
A detailed investigation of these rejections is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is possible that effects due to omitted interest rates, or some feature such as optimism or pessimism (perhaps violating the expected utility axioms), at least when the horizon is longer, are the cause of this. Also, while using the futures price from 8 weeks before maturity served as a good deflator and the transformed data satisfied our tests for stationarity, the numbers in Table 1 suggest that while the means are very close over the entire sample period of 62 quarters, the variances have dipped noticeably in the test period.
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The temporal pattern of the parameter estimates in Table 2 suggests that information gathering may not be uniform over time. Similarly, the behaviour of liquidity traders also appears to vary over time. Since in this paper we study only a single contract at 5 specific intervals, it is not possible to make strong statistical statements about dynamics, but we think that would be an important goal in future work.
F. Agents' Expectation Functions
Please insert Table 6 approximately here.
In Table 6 we provide estimates of the coefficients in each agent's expectation function.
These suggest that in forming the expectation about the liquidating value, the agents in general put less weight on the private signal than on the market price. However, as we go closer to maturity date from Week 7, the weight on the private signal increases from 6% to about 11% (though Week 3 breaks the monotonicity), whereas that on the price increases from about 70% in Week 7 to 93% in Week 3, and then declines a little. The weight on the prior during this time period declines from 23% in Week 7 to 2% in Week 3, and then rises to 3%.
Comparing the numbers in Table 6 with the numbers in Table 4 suggests that the market as a whole does rely more on the aggregate private information of agents (see estimates of β in Table 4 ), than any individual agent does on his own private information (see estimates of h 1 in Table 6 ), though the market as a whole also places much more weight on priors (compare estimates of α in Table 4 with estimates of h 0 in Table 6 ). Taken together these estimates provide a description of the aggregational role of market prices. Since the level of noise in each agent's signal is high, the agent does not rely much on his own signal. Nevertheless the largemarket assumption implies that the aggregate private information is very precise, so each agent relies heavily on the price which conveys some of this aggregate.
Please insert Table 7 approximately here.
In Table 7 we present in Panel A estimates of the signal-to-signal-plus-noise ratio, SSN ratio. These suggest that as we move closer to maturity date from Week 7, prices become more informative until Week 3 before declining a little. For example, when ρ = 0.5, they range from 41% to 89%. The reader should note that by definition (since we can only estimate the quantity ρ σ 2 2 s rather than just σ s 2 independently) as the absolute risk aversion parameter ρ falls, the estimated level of noise σ s 2 will rise, and so signal-to-signal-plus-noise ratio will fall.
In Panel B we partition the total variation in prices into the portion due to the aggregate of private signals and that due to liquidity noise. In contrast to the message from the primitive parameter estimates themselves (in Table 2 we found they were not monotone) here we find that as we approach maturity date the price variation increasingly reflects the aggregate private signal.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We have tried in this paper to demonstrate one approach in estimating the primitive parameters of a perfect competition noisy rational expectations model. Our primary contribution is to provide estimates of important economic parameters such as the precision of private information, and the level of liquidity noise, which we cannot infer directly from descriptive statistics of observable prices. The key ingredient in laying a basis for our estimation procedure in this paper was Proposition 2, which presents a property of the Hellwig (1980) analogous to that presented in this paper. They show that the equilibrium relationship between moments of the price-order flow distribution (which can be estimated directly quite easily, given that these are the natural parameters in a Gaussian setting) and primitive parameters (three variance-covariance matrices governing payoffs, errors in private signals, and liquidity noise) can be inverted. They also identify several testable moment restrictions. Finally, Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996, 1997) also consider the problem of estimating primitive parameters, albeit within a Glosten-Milgrom (1985) -related framework in which traders are allowed discrete strategies. A salient feature of their work is that they also allow for the possibility of no-trading in any round.
While for a long time financial markets were considered the best real-world example of textbook perfect competition, the plethora of imperfect competition models of the financial market in the last decade has disturbed that conventional wisdom. This would make an empirical contest between perfect and imperfect competition interesting. If quantities (trading volumes or order flows) could be treated as observable, in addition to prices and terminal values, it could perhaps suggest a way of setting up an empirical contest between a perfect competition model and an imperfect competition model. Data from some options markets might be useful in this regard.
This is an important target that we leave for future research.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of (P,ν) Series and Estimates of Endogenous Parameters
This table provides the summary statistics of the maturity spot and futures price series from the 7 weeks prior to maturity. The prices are normalized by setting the futures price 8 weeks prior to maturity at 100. For example, a 3 week price of a contract is the futures price 3 weeks prior to maturity over the futures price 8 weeks prior to maturity multiplied by 100. The normalized maturity spot price is our measure for the terminal value, ν, and the normalized futures price is our measure for the market price, P. The data for in-sample estimation are obtained from 42 contracts starting from Sep. '82 contract to Dec. '92 contract, while those for out-of-sample test are 20 contracts from Mar. '93 contract to Dec. '97. Whole sample contains data on all contracts both used in in-sample and out-of-sample. 'Z-matrix' is the variancecovariance matrix of (P, ν). For the subsequent analyses, the parameter estimates of the Z-matrix will be inverted to obtain the estimates of the primitive parameters. The last three rows provide the correlation coefficients between the maturity spot price and futures prices, Corr (P,v), and standard deviations of respective normalized prices. . Hence we report them only for ρ= 1. In the last row, we report the correlation coefficients between the estimates of σ S and σ ε evaluated from the estimated asympotic variance and covariance matrix. 
where µ ν is the prior mean of risky terminal value, i θ~, the i th agent's private information, x S , the liquidity-motivated trades, and P , the price of futures contract. These estimates are obtained by using equations (2)- (3) together with the estimates of primitive parameter given in Table 2 . The estimates are obtained when the risk aversion parameter, ρ, is assumed to be 0.5, 1 and 10, respectively. Table 1 . First, the model is estimated by using the first 42 contract. The parameter estimates are provided in Table 2 . Then, by using Equation (1),
, we evaluate the predicted futures price of the 20 out-of-sample futures contracts using the estimates of α and β given in Table 4 . The prior, µ v , is estimated by taking the mean of the 42 realized spot prices of the in-sample contracts. Then, the predicted futures price of a out-of-sample contract is evaluated by P_pred = αµ v + βv, where v is the ex-post realized spot price at maturity for the contract considered. Once the predicted futures prices are obtained, the following regression model is estimated using the 20 out-of-sample contracts: P = φ 0 + φ 1 P_pred. In the table, the test statistics for the hypotheses that φ 0 = 0 and φ 1 = 1 both individually and jointly are reported together with the parameter estimates. All the tests use heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. The figures in the parenthesis are p-values. , the variance of liquidity-motivated trades. The values of σ ε 2 and σ S 2 are obtained from the parameter estimates given in Table 2 . When the risk-aversion parameter, ρ = 1, the SSN ratio is equal to the coefficient of price, h 2 , in agents' expectation function. This ratio lies in [0, 1] , and is decreasing in both σ ε 2 and σ S 2 . Second, Panel B reports the variance decomposition of the futures price, which is performed by using equation (1). Equation (1) Table 2 ; and those of β and γ, from Table 4 assuming ρ = 1. We have in mind not just the literature in finance, but also the vast literature on demand analysis in economics, and in marketing, dealing with the effects of prices on choices via budget constraints.
2 What little we have seen that may be considered related to this theme is mainly in marketing where there is empirical work on, for example, consumer perceptions of quality from price.
3 Following the equity premium puzzle literature which has attempted to calibrate models for different values of relative risk aversion to assess if the equity premium would seem excessive even after adjusting for risk (e.g. Hansen and Singleton (1983) suggest that reasonable estimates of relative risk aversion may lie between zero and two), we also present estimates for σ 2 S conditional on the absolute risk aversion parameter ρ. Since absolute risk aversion is relative risk aversion divided by wealth, using estimates of relative risk aversion from the calibration literature and even conservative estimates of traders' wealth in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange from which we draw our futures data, would suggest considering absolute risk aversion measures that are much smaller than unity. In any case we present our estimates below in a manner that will allow a reader to use his or her own priors and adjust the numbers accordingly. 4 Notice in the following that the coefficients are independent of our estimates or assumptions about the absolute risk aversion parameter, ρ: these coefficients are influenced by ρ only via ρ σ 2 2 s .
